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■■ INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of modern times, science and 
technology have made immense progress. We have 
probed into the quirkiest realms of physical reality, 
unravelled the evolutionary origins of biological 
complexity and diversity, and we are making new 
discoveries about the peculiarities of the human 
mind every day. We have developed tools to look 
deep into the universe and its past; we prevent, cure 
and have even eradicated diseases that have cost 
millions of lives, and we apply 
our knowledge about genetics 
to develop new medicines 
and plants that reduce the use 
of insecticides in agriculture. 
Yet, despite these impressive 
scientific and technological 
advances, people continue to 
believe the weirdest things. 
Pseudoscience and bordering 
types of irrational beliefs remain 
rampant. Creationists insist that God created the 
universe and life on earth no more than 10,000 years 
ago; highly educated groups oppose vaccinations 
and prefer quackery such as homeopathy to modern 
medicine; and radical environmentalists scare people 
into opposing a technology that contributes to the 
development of a sustainable type of agriculture. 
Why do such irrational beliefs remain so popular and 
persistent? In order to answer this question, we have 
developed an epidemiological approach in a series 
of papers. In this review, we explain what such an 
approach entails, and we summarize and discuss our 
most important findings.
■■ AN EPIDEMIOLOGY OF REPRESENTATIONS
The term epidemiological refers to the epidemiology 
of representations, which is a naturalistic model of 
culture first developed by cognitive anthropologist and 
philosopher Dan Sperber (1996). 
According to this model, culture 
is not a thing, but denotes a 
property, namely of items that are 
more or less widely distributed. 
Thus, to explain culture is to 
explain why some items (ideas, 
practices, artefacts, beliefs, etc.) 
are more popular than others. 
Here is the analogy with the 
epidemiology of diseases: just 
as human bodies are vulnerable to certain pathogens 
and not others, so human minds are more susceptible 
to particular beliefs (and other representations). 
Some representations are more contagious than others. 
We submit that pseudoscience consists of such highly 
contagious beliefs. Hence, to explain the popularity of 
pseudosciences, we need to explain why these beliefs 
appeal so strongly to so many people.
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«SYSTEMS OF MISBELIEFS 
CAN DEVELOP ADAPTIVE 
RATIONALES OF THEIR OWN, 
WHICH CROSS-CUT HUMAN 
PURPOSES AND INTENTIONS»
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The epidemiological approach aims at explaining 
macro-level cultural phenomena in terms of micro-
level interactions between individuals. As such, it is, as 
Lewens (2015) puts it, a «kinetic theory», analogous 
to the theory of gases that accounts for macroscopic 
phenomena in terms of processes at the molecular 
level. In certain contexts, it is useful to adopt the 
perspective of cultural representations «adapting» to 
our mental susceptibilities, within particular contexts, 
and over the course of many microscopic interactions. 
For instance, we can say that 
portrait art «exploits» our face 
recognition system (Morin, 2013).
In the case of pseudoscience, 
this representation-centric 
approach brings two important 
advantages. First, a belief-centric 
approach allows us to get a better 
grip on the cui bono question, 
and to address questions that 
are difficult to resolve in a 
traditional framework. Instead of 
asking what is in it for the purveyors and believers of 
pseudoscience, we can ask what is in it for the beliefs 
themselves. As we have explained in detail elsewhere 
(Boudry & Hofhuis 2017), systems of misbeliefs 
can develop adaptive rationales of their own, which 
cross-cut human purposes and intentions. Sometimes, 
the interests of individuals and beliefs overlap, but 
certainly not always. This is the case, for instance, 
when a person decides to stop a medical treatment 
for cancer and opt for non-efficient herbal remedies. 
The beliefs may prosper, but the patient is unwittingly 
harming himself. In such cases, the beliefs themselves 
provide the only available repository of purposes, i.e., 
the only answer to the cui bono question. Second, 
from a populational point of view, we can afford to 
be agnostic about the question of intentionality on the 
part of purveyors of pseudoscience. Some might be 
conscious frauds that willingly mislead people, but in 
other, and perhaps most cases, they are true believers 
themselves, having no clue as to why they have 
adopted these particular beliefs. Beliefs are shaped 
and distributed through cognitive and communicative 
processes, as if by the works of an invisible hand 
(Boyer, 2001). In this sense, individuals are but links 
in the causal cognitive chains through which beliefs 
spread (Sperber, 1996).
Hence, we will talk about beliefs as intentional 
agents, adopting certain strategies and so on. However, 
we will use such intentional language only in the 
way evolutionary biologists talk about organisms 
adapting to their environment, as for instance when 
a frog has evolved flashy colours in order to scare off 
predators. In fact, the frog has no idea as to why it has 
such colours. It is not even aware that it has a skin, 
let alone a coloured one. Natural selection has done 
the «thinking» for the animal. Similarly, cultural 
evolutionary processes shape beliefs by adapting 
them to the peculiarities of the human mind and 
the environments the mind interacts with. As such, 
patterns emerge that create the impression of beliefs 
strategically transforming in ways that maximize 
their interests (Blancke, Boudry, 
& Pigliucci, 2017). In the 
following, we will briefly 
discuss three strategies which 
pseudoscientific beliefs have 
adopted to expand and stabilize 
their cultural success: intuitive 
appeal, science mimicry and 
immunisation to criticism.
■■ INTUITIVE APPEAL
One important factor that determines the shape and 
popularity of beliefs is the universal make-up of the 
human mind. The epidemiology of representations 
predicts that, ceteris paribus, the beliefs that manage 
to tap into our intuitive expectations stand the greatest 
chance of becoming popular and thus cultural. These 
expectations are constituted by our intuitive ontologies, 
which are non-conscious, automatic and spontaneous 
inferences about particular relevant domains of the 
world around us (Boyer & Barret, 2005). From a very 
young age, for instance, children have the intuitive 
Pseudosciences that exploit our intuitive expectations are more 
likely to succeed culturally. For example, the human inclination 
towards essentialism (which prioritizes essence over existence) 
makes us susceptible to believing in homeopathy’s so-called 
«water memory», which preaches that water retains the essence of 
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expectation that dead objects will not move by 
themselves and that they will not suddenly disappear 
(Spelke, 1990). These expectations are part of our 
intuitive physics. We also hold intuitions about the 
biological world, an intuitive biology. Psychological 
essentialism, for instance, is the mental disposition 
by which we assume that an organism contains 
an invisible and immutable core (an essence) that 
determines its behaviour, development and identity 
(Gelman, 2004). Another intuition, teleological 
thinking, explains natural and biological phenomena 
in terms of their function or goal. For instance, that 
rain exists to water the plants, or that lions exist for 
being displayed in the zoo (e.g., Kelemen, 1999). 
We also have an intuitive psychology, by which we 
automatically explain other people’s behaviour in 
terms of their mental states, such as intentions and 
emotions. Being an exceptionally social species, such 
thinking comes very natural to us, which explains why 
we also overextend it to natural objects and events.
These intuitive expectations are highly robust, 
and strongly affect how beliefs will transform and 
stabilize, in other words, what sorts of belief will 
become cultural. Pseudoscience owes its cultural 
success largely to the fact that it manages to exploit 
our intuitive expectations (Boudry, Blancke, & 
Pigliucci, 2015). Our essentialist inclinations render 
us vulnerable to creationist beliefs that species are 
immutable and fixed categories, and that they have 
remained more or less the same since creation, with 
no change across species barriers (Blancke & De 
Smedt, 2013). They also make us susceptible to belief 
in homeopathy, which holds that water retains the 
essence of a substance even after the substance has 
been diluted to a point where not a single molecule 
can be detected anymore. Essentialism also underlies 
the widespread opposition to genetically modified 
organisms, in that it makes people more critical of 
applications involving transgenesis, i.e., modifications 
using DNA from a different species – even though 
DNA is DNA, no matter where it comes from 
(Blancke, Van Breusegem, De Jaeger, Braeckman, 
& Van Montagu, 2015). Teleological and intentional 
intuitions make us vulnerable to creationist beliefs 
and new-age beliefs about Mother Nature, but also 
to conspiracy theories and beliefs about UFOs and 
alien abduction, all of which postulate intentional 
agents where none are present. The fact that the mind 
holds a system that is dedicated to dealing exclusively 
with minds and not bodies also makes us vulnerable 
to dualist assumptions, which, in turn, make people 
susceptible to believing in ghosts and other non-bodily 
agents. Hence, an epidemiological perspective explains 
the typical features of pseudoscientific beliefs, but also 
accounts for their popularity and persistence. Because 
such beliefs tap into our intuitions, people can easily 
grasp, remember and communicate them. Scientific 
beliefs, in contrast, are often highly counterintuitive, 
demanding considerably more cognitive effort to 
process. Hence, they cannot simply hitchhike on 
human minds to become popular, but they require 
specific institutional support. The unnaturalness of 
science puts it at a serious disadvantage, leaving plenty 
of fertile ground for more natural, but irrational beliefs 
(Boudry et al., 2015).
Some pseudosciences have succeeded over others by imitating 
the external trappings of science: consulting rooms, white coats, 
academic credentials, scientific jargon... thereby taking advantage 
of the social prestige of science and using it as a persuasion 
strategy. In the picture, a reiki or hand imposition session.
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«PEOPLE WILL PREFER BELIEFS WITH 
A SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATE, SO THAT THEY, 
IN TURN, CAN USE IT AS AN ARGUMENT 
TO JUSTIFY THEIR BELIEFS AND 
CONVINCE OTHERS»
■■ SCIENCE MIMICRY
Although irrational beliefs fly in the face of science, 
many of them also tend to adopt the trappings of 
science. This is what justifies our calling them 
«pseudoscience». They pretend to be scientific, 
but they fail to live up to the criteria of epistemic 
warrant and rationality we expect from good science 
(Hansson, 2009). But why would weird beliefs 
emulate science? The reason is that many people 
regard science as an epistemic authority, a trustworthy 
source of information. Even though people may 
dislike some of the findings of science, they are still 
impressed with its technological success and cultural 
prestige. As a result of this, it pays off if you can 
present your beliefs as bearing the imprimatur of 
«science».
This is an instance of what Sperber et al. (2010) 
have termed «epistemic vigilance», i.e., the ability 
to discriminate between reliable and unreliable bits 
of information. In an uncertain world, people need 
to discriminate between reliable reports and mere 
rumour, between trustworthy sources and liars. Any 
organism that opens itself up to outside information, 
but fails to exercise some measure of epistemic 
vigilance, would be a sitting duck for manipulators 
and liars. Epistemic vigilance is exercised in broadly 
two different ways: source and belief content. When 
assessing new information, people can check the 
content of the information for consistency and for 
coherence with background beliefs. Alternatively, they 
can check the source of the information and examine 
whether it is competent and knowledgeable, whether it 
has a good reputation, and whether it has any hidden 
agenda. In other words, despite what some popular 
psychology books tell us (e.g., 
Ariely, 2009), people are not just 
gullible fools who accept just 
about anything they hear on the 
spot.
For any belief to stand 
a chance of success in the 
competition for human minds, 
therefore, it needs to get past 
the screening procedures. As 
we already discussed at length 
above, pseudoscientific beliefs 
tend to tap into our intuitive assumptions, which 
means that they are more likely to cohere with our 
background beliefs. As a result, people will lower 
their vigilance. Furthermore, because pseudoscientific 
beliefs tend to adopt all the outward trappings of 
science, people tend to consider it a trustworthy 
source of information. People 
hold science in high esteem, but 
often they have only a limited 
understanding of what exactly 
«science» amounts to, and in 
virtue of which features science 
has accrued cultural prestige 
(namely, that it consists of 
practices that generate the best 
available knowledge within a 
certain domain). They might 
be impressed by the technological advancements 
that science delivers, or they might ascribe authority 
to science merely on the grounds of its abstruse 
and technical language, its use of sophisticated 
equipment and experimentation, and its reliance on 
quantifiable results and statistics. In itself, this is not 
«PURVEYORS OF 
PSEUDOSCIENCE WILL TRY 
THEIR VERY BEST TO HAVE 
THEIR PAPERS PUBLISHED 
IN RESPECTABLE ACADEMIC 
JOURNALS»
Often, even people who believe in the theory of evolution 
harbour erroneous conceptions about it, especially regarding the 
teleological or ultimate character of the boundaries between 
species. Similarly, many scientific theories are distorted in 
the collective imagination. In the picture, a large ground finch 
(Geospiza magnirostris), one of Darwin’s well-known finches, 
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a problem, as these are often pretty good indications 
of scientific standing. However, this situation creates 
opportunities for irrational beliefs. They can mimic 
the outward features of science to create a trustworthy 
impression, thus exploiting the mechanisms for 
epistemic vigilance. Purveyors of pseudoscience will 
try their very best to have their papers published in 
respectable academic journals and they will boast 
their academic credentials in order to convince 
people that their beliefs are trustworthy. Apart from 
that, we should also take into account the limitations 
of epistemic vigilance itself. The mechanisms for 
epistemic vigilance have evolved to deal with one-
on-one interactions, in which it is relatively easy to 
check the content and gauge the trustworthiness of 
the source, not with complex matters of science and 
pseudoscience, where the content 
is abstruse and often (partly) 
incomprehensible, and the 
reliability of the source depends 
on complex chains of trust and 
expertise.
Most pseudosciences will 
not only mimic the features 
of science, but explicitly claim 
the honorific title of science. In 
other words, the quality label 
of science is explicitly used 
as an argument to persuade people and thus to tap 
into people’s epistemic vigilance (on this function of 
arguments, see Mercier & Sperber, 2011, 2017). In a 
cultural environment where science is acknowledged 
as an epistemic authority, emphasizing that a belief is 
scientific – even if it is not – is a convincing argument 
indeed. Moreover, at the receiver’s end, people will 
prefer beliefs with a scientific certificate, so that they, 
in turn, can use it as an argument to justify their 
beliefs and convince others. The result is that, in 
particular cases, irrational beliefs that mimic science 
outcompete similar beliefs that do not. In other 
cases, pseudoscientists will downplay the authority 
of science, pretending to offer an «alternative way 
of knowing», which supposedly stands on an equal 
footing with science. And sometimes, as in the case 
of so-called «creation science», the two strategies are 
merged together.
The attraction of pseudoscience is not just a 
cognitive phenomenon, but has a motivational 
component as well, which is captured by the notion 
of epistemic negligence. This captures the idea that 
people are lazy reasoners. They are easily satisfied 
with beliefs and arguments that they have come to 
hold on an intuitive basis or on the basis of trust. 
Understanding scientific concepts and theories 
requires a lot of effort, an investment which most 
people simply – and somewhat understandably – are 
not prepared to make. As a result, even if people 
profess belief in modern science, they only have a 
superficial understanding of the relevant theories 
and concepts, which they tend to distort into 
more intuitive representations. For instance, even 
people who endorse the theory of evolution, still 
harbour teleological intuitions about the direction of 
evolution, and still struggle with a purely populational 
understanding of species boundaries. As a result, 
popular conceptions of modern scientific theories 
actually border on pseudoscience anyway. This 
closes the mental gap between real science and 
pseudoscience, thus creating the ideal circumstances 
for pseudoscience to flourish and 
to present itself as the real thing 
(for more details, see Blancke et 
al., 2017). 
■■ IMMUNE TO CRITICISM
Even though some irrational 
beliefs have an advantage over 
scientific ones, in that they 
typically tap into our intuitions, 
they also have a significant 
drawback. They are potentially destabilized by 
falsifying evidence, and by rational criticism. This 
is where scientific beliefs have a head start: because 
they are supported by empirical evidence and are 
internally consistent, they can afford to expose 
themselves to empirical testing.
Every pseudoscience, one way or the other, is 
confronted with this resistance of the world out there. 
If they want to hold sway over human minds, intuitive 
appeal and cultural mimicry will not be enough. 
Beliefs that are false in a manner that is immediately 
obvious or open to inspection are unlikely to gain 
wide acceptance, even if they are intuitive. As we 
noted above, people are not as gullible as is often 
supposed. If a belief is palpably false, people will be 
unlikely to endorse it.
In order to stand a decent chance of cultural 
survival, therefore, pseudoscience needs protective 
measures against reality. In one way or another, 
they have to ensure that they are never threatened 
by empirical evidence and rational criticism. 
For this reason, one of the recurring features of 
pseudosciences is the reliance on immunizing 
strategies which inoculate the theory against 
falsification and criticism (Boudry & Braeckman, 
«IN ORDER TO STAND 
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2011, 2012). There are many different ways to forestall 
falsification and prevent critical scrutiny. Many 
pseudosciences contain theory-internal explanations 
for opposition against the belief system itself, 
which Boudry and Braeckman dubbed «epistemic 
defence mechanisms». For instance, Sigmund Freud 
famously suggested that the opposition against 
psychoanalysis is a ringing confirmation of one of 
its main predictions: that critics are under the spell 
of unconscious resistance, desperate to cover up the 
inconvenient truths of Freudian theory. Scientologists 
and Marxists have constructed their own version 
of the resistance argument. It is quite neat, as it is a 
trump card that can be used in any discussion, against 
any given argument.
If a belief systems postulates invisible intentional 
agents, as many pseudosciences do, a whole range 
of immunizing strategies opens up: the secret 
conspirators may be planting false evidence to throw 
us off the scent, and the visiting extraterrestrials may 
wish to escape detection by earthlings. Ghosts can 
play hide and seek, and the devil may tempt us with 
clever skeptical arguments (some creationists believe 
that Satan himself whispered the idea of evolution in 
Darwin’s ear).
Parapsychology has a whole set of built-in defence 
mechanisms for fending off unwelcome findings. 
In particular, many parapsychologists believe that 
the presence of inquisitive minds disturbs psychic 
phenomena, a phenomenon they call «negative psi 
vibration» or «catapsi» (notice the technical jargon). 
They also believe that psi forces are shy and actively 
evade being detected, thus 
explaining the lack of empirical 
evidence.
Another immunizing tactic 
is to turn central concepts 
and claims into moving 
targets, amenable to a range 
of interpretations. Astrology 
and assorted forms of fortune-
telling provide good cases 
in point. Horoscopes look as 
if they contain specific predictions or interesting 
observations about your character, but as soon as they 
are threatened with falsification, they become vague 
or turn into metaphors.
■■ CONCLUDING REMARKS
Why do irrational beliefs still thrive in the age of 
science, and why do they often adopt the trappings 
of science? An epidemiological approach to culture 
allows us to answer these 
questions. First, many such 
beliefs, though they have 
no basis in reality, appeal to 
universal human intuitions. 
This gives them a significant 
head start over scientific beliefs, 
which are famously inimical 
to our intuitive worldview. 
Second, because science is held 
in high esteem in our culture, mainly in virtue of 
the technological fruits it bears, it pays for irrational 
beliefs to adopt the outward trappings of science. 
Given that people have a poor understanding of the 
authority of science anyway, they will have a hard 
time telling the difference, and they will fall for 
this sort of cultural mimicry. Ironically, explicitly 
claiming the imprimatur of science has proved to 
be a successful strategy, even for beliefs that are 
anything but scientific, and that are roundly rejected 
Being immunized against criticism is another survival strategy of 
pseudosciences. For example, if a belief such as parapsychology 
proposes the existence of invisible agents, we can easily conclude 
that ghosts do not want to be seen by those who doubt them. 
In the picture, the writer Arthur Conan Doyle, great advocate of 
occultism, photographed by the «spirit photographer» Ada Deane 
in 1922.
«PARAPSYCHOLOGY HAS 
A WHOLE SET OF BUILT-IN 
DEFENCE MECHANISMS FOR 
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by the scientific community. Third, even though 
pseudoscientific beliefs have no basis in reality, unlike 
scientific ones, they have evolved clever tricks to 
avoid exposure to destabilizing falsifications, and to 
prevent critical scrutiny. Thus, pseudosciences have 
developed their own immune systems, ensuring their 
hold over people’s minds. 
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In order to protect themselves from critical scrutiny or 
falsification, some irrational beliefs resort to ambiguity. This is the 
case, for example, of fortune-tellers and astrologers, who provide 
their clients with general and uncommitted information, in order 
to protect themselves in case their predictions do not come true.
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